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Gender Biases in Delegation 
 
 






We explore gender biases towards delegation in a modified (delegation) dictator game. Under 
compulsory delegation and no (gender) revelation no significant gender differences are observed for 
choices made by principals. Male agents share little with the recipients, meanwhile, female (agents) are 
not responsive to the incentive scheme and return less to the dictator. However, a clear dichotomy in 
female behavior is observed under gender revelation. As principals, females behave similar to their 
male counterparts and appoint as agents those who return more to them. On the other hand, as agents’ 
females show greater redistributive concerns relative to their male counterparts in the early periods 
even though it is detrimental to them over time. This results in both male and female principals 




We study whether there are gender differences in delegation (Hamman, Loewenstein and Weber 2010) in 
the standard dictator game. In the gender treatment we reveal the gender of the agents. The principal then 
chooses between one of the two agents who then decide how to split the initial endowment between the dictator 
and the recipient. 1 We find that, under no gender revelation, there are no gender differences in allocation 
decisions. This is not the case under gender revelation there are no differences (in allocation decisions) between 
male and female principals’. Female agents, on the other hand, allocate less to their own principals relative to 
their male counterparts in the early periods. Consequently female agents are selected less frequently in 
subsequent periods. 
Literature Review 
Gender differences in competition, preferences, and cooperation in teams has been studied in the 
experimental literature (see Croson and Gneezy 2009 for a review). The results point towards multiple factors 
that contribute towards the so-called gender gap. For example, both sex discriminate and women tend to 
discriminate against their own sex. When selecting partners either sex has preference over the opposite sex.  
Further, men have a stronger response to competitive pressures (Niederle and Vesterlund 2007) while the context 
and group composition is an important determinant of the outcomes. 
Examination of high paid occupation categories shows that women's salary is generally lower relative to 
men's within these occupations (Booth et al. 2003). Gneezy, Niederle and Rustichini (2003) show that, although 
men and women perform equally well solving mazes in a non-competitive environment, there are large gender 
differences in performance in a competitive one. The gender gap in performance is mainly driven by an increase 
in men's performance in competitive environments. Niederle and Vesterlund (2007)2 results suggest that men are 
substantially more overconfident than women. Moreover the authors claim that while "(…) women shy away 
from competition, (...) men embrace it".3 These findings suggest that taste for competition may play an important 
role in explaining gender disparity at the top-level positions (also see survey by Croson and Gneezy 2009). 
The results concerning gender differences in generosity in the dictator game are mixed. Bolton and 
Katok (1998) find no significant male-female differences when the dictators do not know the gender of their 
recipients. On the other hand, Eckel and Grossman (1996), conclude that all-female groups are more altruistic 
than the all-male groups.4 Aguiar et al. (2009) explore how subjects perceive behavioral differences between 
men and women. Their results suggest that females consider males to be more generous but males do not reveal 
any gender bias. 
                                                 
1 As in Bartling and Fischbacher (2012) we also use delegation as a tool to shift and bear responsibility. 
2 This experiment closely follows Gneezy, Niederle, and Rustichini (2003) 
3 Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007, p.1 
4Notice that in Eckel and Grossman (1996) the dictators are informed about the gender of the recipients. 
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The link between responsibility and delegating decisions is studied by both Bartling and Fischbacher 
(2012) and Hamman et al. (2010). Bartling and Fischbacher (2012) consider a variation of the dictator game. 
They allow for delegation and employ a punishment option to elicit responsibility attributions. Their findings 
suggest that when delegation is followed by an unfair split of the initial endowment, the agent who makes the 
allocation decision is punished much more than the principal who passed over the decision. These results show 
that responsibility can be effectively shifted and that it is a powerful motive to delegate a decision right.5 Note 
that Bartling and Fischbacher (2012) do not analyze gender differences. 
Hamman et al. (2010) explore a dictator game with delegation. They look at the responsibility shifting 
motive behind it. They explore the hypothesis that a principal may feel more detached, and therefore less 
responsible, for an outcome when he delegates a decision. Comparing a baseline condition in which principals 
make the decision themselves against an agent condition in which principals select agents to make the decision 
on their behalf. They find that principals are significantly less generous toward recipients in the agent condition 
than when they act individually in the baseline condition. Moreover, principals in the baseline condition report 
feeling responsible for outcomes, but principals acting through agents do not feel responsible for the final 
allocation. Principals that delegate the allocation decision judge their behavior as significantly fairer than those 
who take the decision directly. The authors conclude that "through the use of agents (...) accountability for 
morally questionable behavior can become vertically diffused, with no individual taking responsibility" 
(Hamman et al. 2010, p.2). 
In this paper we extend Hamman et al. (2010) to investigate gender biases in delegation. The paper is 
organized as follows. Section 2 presents the experimental design. The main results are discussed in section 3. 
Section 4 concludes and discusses possible extensions. 
 
2. Experimental Design 
The experiments were conducted via computer interface using z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). Participants 
were recruited using Orsee from a randomly generated e-mailing list of students at Universidad Carlos III of 
Madrid. The recruitment email was standard and placed no emphasis on gender issues. Each participant took part 
in one treatment only. A 5€ show-up fee was paid in addition to the earnings from the experiment and a 2€ fees 
for completing a questionnaire. Including the instructions (Appendix B) the experiment lasted for approximately 
forty-five minutes. The average payoff, including the show up fees, was 12.11€. As no formal IRB procedure 
was in place approval for Economic experiments conducted at Carlos III was provided by the Dean of the 
Faculty of Social Sciences and Law. 
                                                 
5The idea that a person can avoid a punishment by passing on the decision is also explored by Coffman (2011). This author analyses 
settings in which the second party is blameless for the outcome. 
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We ran three treatments with a total of 19 sessions6 (12 rounds/session) with a total of 254 subjects (see 
Table 1). Each player was assigned a number and a role at the start. These were kept the same during the 
experiment. Participants were given instruction hand-outs which were subsequently read aloud. To avoid framing 
Dictators, Recipients or Agents, were denoted as “players A”, “B” and “C”, respectively. Participants were 
informed that the experiment lasted for 12 rounds and that the matching in all rounds was random. For payment 
purposes, each envelope was marked with the number assigned to the players during the treatment. Once a 
subject finished answering the questionnaire, he/she could collect his/her envelope. 
 
    Table 1. Subjects per treatment 
 Baseline Compulsory Delegation Compulsory Delegation and Gender Revelation 
# Sessions 5 4 10 








# Principals/ Recipients/Agents 








The first treatment (Baseline) was the standard dictator game. The other two treatments were 
Compulsory Delegation (Hamman et al. 2010) and Compulsory Delegation and Gender Revelation. Table 2 
summarizes the main differences across treatments. Both players, dictators and recipients, were paid for one 
randomly chosen round at the end of the experiment. Agents meanwhile were paid the 5€ show up fee and 
received an additional 5€ as starting capital. They accumulate earnings in the experiment according to the 
following rule: 
πi=-0.45+0.15*nj 
where nj represents the number of principals7 choosing agent i. The interpretation for πi  (Hamman et al., 2010) is 
that the agents face a constant, fixed cost (0.45€) and marginal revenue (0.15€), when making the allocation 
decision. Agents' earnings in a round are independent of the allocation decision(s) they make and only depend on 
the number of principals selecting them. By doing this the net total payment to all agents in a round is kept fixed 
at 0€. Moreover, such a scheme avoids directly linking the agent's reward and the principal's payoff. 
                                                 
6In general, 14 players participated in each session. However, we ran session 2 and 4 of the baseline treatment with 12 players, and 
session 3 with only 10 players. Only 10 students showed up to participate to the 1st session of the Compulsory Delegation and Gender 
Revelation treatment. We ran five sessions with six rounds each of the Compulsory Delegation and Gender Revelation for another 
experiment. 
7In one session of the CD treatment only 10 players showed up. Four of them participated as dictators, four as recipients and two as 
agents. In this last case the payment scheme for agents was πi=-0.45+0.225*ni, in order to be comparable with the one of the other 






     Table 2. Description of treatments 
 Baseline Compulsory Delegation 
Compulsory Delegation 




Dictator game with 
delegation 
Dictator game with 
delegation 
Delegation - Compulsory Compulsory 
Allocation decision made by - Agents Agents 
Agents' gender - Not revealed Revealed 
 
Treatment 1: Baseline (BL) 
This is the standard dictator game with no gender revelation. We run five sessions: two with 12 and 14 
players, and one with 10 (see Table A.1, Appendix A, for details). In each session, half of the students are 
assigned the role of dictators and the other half the role of the recipients. Students know that the experiment is 
being conducted in pairs and that they will be randomly matched with another participant in each subsequent 
round. To enable comparisons with subsequent treatments we assign three female and male students the role of 
dictators.8 The rest of the subjects are assigned the role of recipients. Among the 62 subjects who participated in 
this treatment, 27 were females.9 All pairings were anonymous. 
An initial endowment of 10€ is assigned to each player. Dictators decided how to allocate (in 10 cent 
increments) the initial endowment to recipients. Once the decision was made, recipients were informed about the 
amount of money they had been assigned. 
                                                 
8 See Table A.1 in Appendix A for further details.  
9 Having an equal representation of men and women is not strictly necessary for our results. Consider the recipients first. They do not play 
an active role in the game. Moreover, as the dictators are not told the gender of the recipients, the latter is not of prime relevance in this 
treatment. Concerning the principals, the issue is more complex. The results remain valid even if we do not have an equal representation 
of men and women. For instance, Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) do not select the participants according to their gender. They claim that 
this helps get "(...) a picture of the male-female difference that would naturally occur in an experiment not designed to test for such 
differences". On the other hand, having a gender balance in the dictator-group helps mitigate possible group effects. Moreover, an 
approximately equal number of males and females across treatments facilitate comparisons and interpretations. 
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Treatment 2: Compulsory Delegation (CD) 
This structure game is the same as in Hamman et al. (2010). An initial endowment of 10€ is assigned to 
principals in each round who must then choose one of the two agents to make the allocation decision on their 
behalf. Following Hamman et al. (2010), each agent was matched with three principals in the first round. By 
doing this the two agents started with the same number of decisions. However, from round two, each principal 
was allowed to choose which agent they wanted to delegate the decision to. Further, if an agent is chosen by 
more than one principal then the allocation choice for each pair is independent of the other. 
A total of 4 sessions were run with 14 participants per session (total = 56) providing us with 6 principals, 
6 recipients and 2 agents. Note that agent’s pair is always formed of a male and a female. This is done to enable 
comparison with the Gender Revelation treatment. 
The gender of the agents is not revealed to the principals. Principal delegates the decision to allocate 10€ 
to either of the two agents. Agents then decide on how to allocate this amount between principals and recipients. 
From Bartling and Fischbacher (2012) and Hamman et al. (2010) we know that agents end up sharing 
substantially less under Compulsory Delegation. We want to see if their result replicates in our experiments and 
also whether there are differences across gender (for agents) and choice of agents when gender is not revealed. 
Principals choose the agents according to the registration number assigned to each one of them.10 The 
agents who are not selected in a round see a waiting screen while the other agents made the allocation decisions. 
Subsequently each player is informed about the allocation choice of his/her corresponding agent. Table 2 
highlights the treatment details. 
 
Treatment 3: Compulsory Delegation with Gender Revelation (CDGR) 
In this treatment the gender of the agents is made known to the principals. Recall that the agents are 
made up of a male/female pair. Gender of the agents was revealed to see whether the knowledge of the gender 
affected the choice of the agent by the Principal. Ten sessions were run with 14 participants per sessions, except 
in the first one where 10 students participated (136 participants in total). In the last 5 sessions six rounds were 
obtained from another treatment where we ran six rounds with exactly the same conditions. See details in Table 
A.1 in Appendix. 
A crucial issue in this experiment concerns the role of beliefs. In particular, anticipating here a point that 
will be made clear later on, we want to be able to control for principals' beliefs towards agents' fairness. Recall 
that our goal is to assess whether a "gender bias" in delegation arises. Eliciting beliefs in a repeated game is 
                                                 
10 We modify this condition in the next treatment (Treatment 3, Compulsory Delegation and Gender Revelation). 
7 
tricky. Our belief-elicitation protocol shares some similarities with the one used by Charness and Dufwenberg 
(2006). At the beginning of the first round, before the delegation decision, we ask the principals to make a guess 
about what will be the average allocation of each of the four agents during the game. The principals are rewarded 
50 cents for every correct answer. 11  Although very simple to implement, this procedure is not free from 
criticism. Eliciting beliefs may alter the way they play Rutström and Wilcox (2009) and motivate subjects to 
construct more sophisticated models of their opponents' behavior. 
We justify our elicitation protocol considering that our main interest pertains regarding the innate beliefs 
that principals have about gender fairness. Eliciting these beliefs at the end of the game would definitely give 
biased opinions based on experience. Moreover, we believe that the incentives the principals face in the game are 
strong enough to overcome the possible influence of belief elicitation on their subsequently chosen actions.12 




We first look at the summary statistics. Average amount earned (by gender) by principals and allocated 
by agents in each treatment are presented in Table 3 and 4, respectively. Including the show-up and the 
questionnaire fees, on average, principals, recipients and agents earned 15.02€, 9.32€ and 11.57€, respectively.13 
 
                                        Table 3. Average earnings by principals in each treatment 
 BL CD CDGR 
Females 7.83 (2.56) 8.41 (2.40) 7.17 (2.49) 
Males 7.55 (2.26) 7.52 (2.43) 7.41 (2.19) 
Both 7.68 (2.40) 7.96 (2.45) 7.39 (2.34) 
   Note: Standard deviation in parentheses 
  
                                                 
11 The guess was considered correct if it is contained in an interval of width 50 cents around the outcome. 
12 A pre-play belief elicitation approach is applied for instance by McKelvey and Page (1990). 
13When asked to evaluate their payoffs in the questionnaire at the end of the game, the subjects expressed on average a moderate level of 
satisfaction (79% of the students agree with the statement that the total profit offered in the experiment was quite relevant to them). 
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Table 4. Average allocation from agents to principals 
 CD CDGR 
Females 6.45 (1.69) 7.03 (2.11) 
Males 8.68 (2.43) 7.44 (2.49) 
Both 7.57 (2.37) 7.24 (2.32) 
               Note: Standard deviation in parentheses  
 
One can see from the tables that the actions of females are conditioned by the role they play. In the CD 
treatment, as principals females earn more (8.41€) than males (7.52€) on average, meanwhile, as agents females 
allocate less to principals (6.45€ in average) than their male counterparts (8.68€ in average). Below we look at 
the results by treatments in depth. 
 
3.1 Baseline: 
Average earnings for principals in the BL treatment were 7.68€.14 One can see (Figure 1) the average 
amount earned by principals in the BL treatment (by period and gender). A Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test 
shows that there are no significant differences between the average amount allocated by males and females (KS 
p-value=0.536). This result is along the lines of Bolton and Katok (1998) where they found no statistically 
significant gender differences in the standard dictator game. 
 




                                                 
14 Average earnings in Hamman et al. (2010) were 7.82€. 
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3.2 Compulsory delegation treatment 
Relative to the BL the earnings of the principals increase in the CD treatment. This confirms the result in 
Hamman et al. (2000) where delegation produced a decrease in the amount allocated to the receivers relative to 
the standard dictator game.15 One can observe in Figure 2 that the average amount earned by principals in CD 
treatment is higher in almost all the periods. Note that we found end-game effects in the last round under 
compulsory delegation. In 4 out of 24 cases, the agents chose to give nothing to principal in the last round. Our 
results are significant even if we include the last period (KS p-value=0.031). 
 
Figure 2. BL vs. CD treatments: Average amount earned by principals 
 
 
Result 1: The amount shared by agents under compulsory delegation significantly decreases relative to the 
baseline treatment. 
 
Principals’ in the CD treatment earn more than in the baseline as they choose the agent who returned 
more to them. It is clear that the principals are less sensitive about the allocation decisions when given the 
opportunity to pass the responsibility of the decision (Hamman et al. 2010) to an agent and behave more in their 
own self-interest.  
Recall that the results from the BL treatment suggest that female and male principal´s behave similarly. 
Now we check whether they show similar patterns in their allocation decisions under compulsory delegation. 
One can observe in Figure 3 that female principals earned significantly more than their male counterparts in all 
periods except the last one (KS p-value=0.000). 
 
                                                 
15 In Hamman et al. (2010), the average agent allocation to principal´s was 8.27€. 
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Figure 3. CD treatment: Average amount earned by principals  
 
 
Higher earnings for principal´s in the CD treatment are entirely driven by allocations made by male 
agents (Figure 4). Allocations made by male agents are significantly different from those of female agents (KS p-
value=0.000). It is clear that, while being rational in agent selection as principals, female agents allocate less to 
the principal. 
 
Figure 4. CD treatment: Average amount allocated by agents  
 
 
Result 2: As principals, females (similar to males) select agents that maximize their payoffs. This behavior is, 
however, not carried over when they act as agents where they share more with the recipients. 
 
So far our results show that in a simple dictator game, the behavior of men and women does not 
significantly differ. Once we introduce compulsory delegation, female principals appoint as agents those who 
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show less concern about fairness. Contrarily, female agents show greater distributional concerns relative to their 
male counterparts. In what follows we ask whether we find the same results under gender revelation. 
 
3.3. Compulsory delegation with gender revelation 
In this treatment the information regarding agents’ gender is common information. We find that once the 
identity of female agents is revealed they are more responsive to the incentive scheme. Relative to CD the 
average earnings of principals’ decrease (Figure 5) significantly under gender revelation (KS p-value=0.031). 
Further, under gender revelation, the behavior of female agents, contrary to what was observed earlier, changes 
and they transfer significantly more to the principals (Figure 6, KS p-value=0.031). Compared with the CD 
treatment, male agents reduce their transfers to principals (Figure 7, KS p-value=0.008). This tells us that once 
agents' gender is revealed to the principals, female agents become sensitive to the incentive scheme and respond 
by behaving in a more self-interested manner. Female agents react to the incentive scheme only when the 
information about their “identity” is revealed. 
 





Figure 6. CD vs. CDGR treatments: Average amount allocated by female agents  
 
 
Figure 7. CD vs. CDGR treatments: Average amount allocated by male agents  
 
 
We will now further study this result in detail. We first define the following variables: 
o dif_allocit  is the difference between the amount allocated by the agent i in period t minus the 
amount allocated in period t-1.  
o less_chosenit is a dummy that equals one if the agent i is chosen by the principals less frequently 
in period t than in period t-1 and zero otherwise. 
If the incentive scheme works, when an agent is chosen less times in t than in the previous period, she/he 
will allocate more amount to the principal to so that the principal chooses them in the following periods. If this 
were the case then the variable dif_alloc will increase. As is observed in Figure 6, females increase their 
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allocation with the time. Given this we include the variable period in our models and the interaction between 
period and the dummy less_chosen to see how this affects the incentive scheme along time. 
We use panel data regression models to look at female and male behaviors under the two treatments: CD 
and CDGR. The used panel data model is  
dif_allocit=  β less_chosenit +η periodt +δ interactionit+αi + vit 
where i =1,…,N (agents), t =1,…,12 (periods); β, η and δ are parameters; αi denotes the unobserved individual-
specific time-invariant effects that are assumed as random16 and vit is the residual disturbance term with zero 
mean, constant variance, and uncorrelated across time and individuals. Generalized least squares regressions 
with cluster-robust standard errors are used as estimation method.  Results are presented in Table 5 for CD 
treatment and Table 6 for CDGR treatment. 
 
Table 5. Regressions on allocation differences between periods in CD treatment    
CD Treatment 
FEMALES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
less_chosen 0.22 (0.99)  0.19 (0.64) 0.69 (0.48) 
period  -0.02 (-0.68) -0.01 (-0.27) 0.01 (0.12) 
interaction    -0.09 (-0.44) 
Number of agents 4 
Observations 42 
MALES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
less_chosen 0.62 (1.58)  0.70 (1.70)* -0.71 (-0.92) 
period  -0.10 (-0.86) -0.11 (-0.91) -0.17 (1.14) 
interaction    0.19 (1.26) 
Number of agents 4 
Observations 43 
Note: z-statistics in parentheses. *, **, *** significant at 10%, 5% and 1% 
 
                                                 
16 After running Hausman tests for all regressions. 
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In the CD treatment, the incentive schemes is useful only for males, if in the current period they are 
chosen less times, they increase their allocation in 0.70€. This suggests that, in response to the incentive scheme, 
male agents behave in favor of their own principals. So far our results show that in a simple dictator game, the 
behavior of men and women does not significantly differ. Once we introduce delegation, female principals 
appoint as agents those who show less concern about fairness. Contrarily, female agents show greater 
distributional concerns relative to their male counterparts. 
 
Table 6. Regressions on allocation differences between periods in CDGR treatment    
CDGR treatment 
FEMALES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
less_chosen 1.01 (1.57)  1.07 (1.57) 2.20 (2.16)** 
period  0.05 (1.29) 0.07 (1.43) 0.09 (1.82)* 
interaction    -0.21 (-1.62) 
Number of agents 10 
Observations 70 
MALES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
less_chosen 1.37 (2.64)***  1.35 (2.66)** 0.85 (0.47) 
period  -0.11 (-1.26) -0.10 (-1.23) -0.12 (-1.01) 
interaction    0.08 (0.35) 
Number of agents 10 
Observations 72 
Note: z-statistics in parentheses. *, **, *** means significant at 10%, 5% and 1% 
 
In CDGR treatment, the incentives scheme is useful for both gender. If the number of times that male is 
chosen decreased, in the next period agent increased the allocation with respect the previous period by 1.35€. 
Similarly for females, the allocation increased by 2.20€, however, with time this amount decreases (interaction 
sign is negative, p-value of Wald test about joint significance of variable less_chosen and interaction is 0.0975). 
Observe that for females the difference between consecutive allocations increases with time (positive coefficient 
for period variable)  
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Result 3:  Female agents respond to the incentive scheme once their gender is revealed.  Male agents respond to 
incentive scheme both with and without gender revelation.  
 
A utility maximizing principal should rationally delegate to the agent that maximizes their payoff 
without taking account her/his gender. During the experiment we ask the principals about their beliefs towards 
an agents' fairness. On average, principals expect to receive 5.22€ if the agent is a male and 5.23€ for females’.  
A test on equality of means shows that a priori principals do not hold different expectations on agents’ fairness.  
Now we study if these beliefs are reflected in the delegation process. That is, do subjects begin the 
experiment with prior beliefs on gender? The behavior of the principals at the beginning of the game, when the 
agent behavior is not known, should reveal innate preferences towards a specific gender. In Table 7 the 
percentage of male agents chosen by principals in CDGR treatment in each period is presented. If there is no 
gender preference these percentages should be closer to 50%. Percentages significantly different to 50% are 
marked with asterisks. 
 
Table 7. Percentages of male agents in each period 
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 
% male agents chosen 50 39.66* 43.10 56.89 62.07** 65.51*** 
Period 7 8 9 10 11 12 
% male agents chosen 64.29* 46.43 46.43 53.57 39.29 42.86 
Note: *, **, *** significant at 10%, 5% and 1% 
 
In the second period the percentage of male decrease significantly from 50%. In this period, principal do not 
have sufficient information about agent behavior and there is a tendency to choose a female. When their 
allocation decisions in the early periods become common knowledge, i.e. the smaller amounts they allocated to 
the principals (see Figure 8), this tendency changes. Now we study if this result is maintained when we control 
the average amount allocated by agent in previous period.  
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Figure 8. CDGR treatment: Average amount allocated by agents to principals 
 
 
We define the following variables: 
o n_chosenit is the  number of time that agent i is chosen by principals in period t.   
o agent is maleit is a dummy variable that is equal one if agent i is male in period t. 
o av_allocit-1 is average amount allocated by agent i in period t-1. 
We study the relationship between these variables using the panel data model:  
n_chosenit=  β agent is maleit +η av_allocit-1 +αi + vit 
where i =1,…,N (agents), t =1,…,12 (periods); β and η are parameters; αi denotes the unobserved individual-
specific time-invariant effects that are assumed as random17 and vit is the residual disturbance term with zero 
mean, constant variance, and uncorrelated across time and individuals. Cluster-robust standard errors are used 
during estimation.  Results are presented in Table 8. 
 
Table 8. Regressions on number of times that an agent is chosen 
 All periods Periods 1-3 Periods 4-8 Periods 9-12 
Agent is male 0.27 (0.54) -1.24 (-1.85)* 1.21 (2.10)** -0.51 (-0.62) 
Average amount allocated in t-1 0.23 (3.21)*** 0.47 (4.03)*** 0.18 (3.55)*** 0.33 (2.11)** 
Number of agents 20 20 20 10 
Observations 148 37 73 38 
     Note: z-statistics in parentheses. *, **, *** means significant at 10%, 5% and 1% 
                                                 
17 We consider a random model because the variable “agent is male” does not vary across a period.  
17 
The coefficient for gender is negative and significantly different from zero at 10% during the first three rounds. 
This means that the number of times that an agent is chosen increases if the agent is female in the early periods 
of the experiment. In periods between 4 and 8, this coefficient is positive (and significant). This result can be 
interpreted as: initially female agents are not discriminated against, however, as their allocation decisions in the 
early periods become common knowledge, i.e. the smaller amounts they allocated to the principals, male agents 
are chosen more frequently. This makes good sense, as the average amount allocated increases, the agent is 
chosen more frequently. 
 
Result 4: No gender bias in agent selection is observed in the early periods. Male agents are chosen more often 
in later periods as the allocation decisions of females in the early periods become common knowledge. 
 
Summing up, under gender revelation principals' earnings suffer a drop relative to the no-revelation 
treatment. The drop in the earnings is explained mainly due to a decrease in the amount allocated to the 
principals by male agents. Investigating the relation between the gender of the principal and the agent we 
discover that, at least in the first rounds, female agents are not discriminated against. However, they share more 
with the recipients than their male counterparts in the early rounds. This creates a negative reputation for them, 
which in the end results in the principals preferring male agents in later periods. 
 
4. Comments and Further Extension 
In this paper we use a variation of the dictator game to explore gender biases towards delegation. The 
results from our experiments allow us to unveil some interesting patterns in the delegating process. There are no 
significant gender differences in the simple dictator game. Allowing for delegation we find that both female and 
male principals select the agent who shows less fairness concerns. As pointed out by Hamman et al. (2010) this 
shows that delegation may be a mechanism that relieves them from any responsibility towards the action. That 
is, once removed from the final decision, principals act in a more self-interested manner. 
However, male/female behavior differs significantly when they act as agents and changes as the 
experiment progresses. Under no gender revelation, female agents show greater distributional concerns, even if 
this is detrimental to their own benefit. However, a dichotomy in females’ behavior is observed. As principals 
they make choices similar to males, whereas as delegating agents they have greater concerns for fairness than 
their male peers’. This suggests that female concern for fairness is environmental specific. 
Under gender revelation we find that, at the beginning, female agents are not discriminated against. 
However, the smaller amounts they allocated to the principals contribute in creating a negative reputation for 
them. Due to this (and regardless of their gender) principals prefer male agents.  
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In the CD and CDGR, agents are forced to compete against each other in order to be selected by the 
principals. The question that naturally arises is how much this competition affects agents' sharing decisions. The 
results by Hamman et al. (2010) provide a partial answer to this question. They conduct a control treatment in 
which principals and recipients are re-matched every round but each principal remains paired with the same 
agent for the entire duration of the experiment. In each round, principals decide whether to make allocation 
decisions individually or to delegate it to his/her paired agent. The payment structure is such that the agent wants 
to be selected by the principal. However, the competition among agents is eliminated since each principal/agent 
pair is independent of all other agents. 
Comparing this result with their other treatments, Hamman et al. (2010) suggest that competition 
between agents does not affect the conclusion drawn before. Principals generally prefer to act through agents and 
that such delegation results in very little sharing with recipients. In conclusion, Hamman et al. (2010) findings 
suggest that agents' sharing decision is not highly affected by competition. 
Concerning new strands of research, the dictator game is a rather special setting and is far from being 
sufficient for explaining discrimination in the marketplace. As mentioned earlier, our main focus was to study 
how the two genders reacted to delegation both in the case where they delegate the decision right and in the case 
where they are delegated the responsibility of some kind of decision, i.e. decisions which involve unfair 
outcomes. Indeed, it would be worth extending this analysis to other types of settings and games. Specifically, 
one can consider gender neutral games which involve real effort by the subjects. Such contexts provide an ideal 
environment to analyze the relationship between self-confidence, delegation and gender difference. Our intuition 
is that gender specific preferences on delegation may depend on the difficulty of the task. 
A further step would consist of extending the study to include delegation in a team. This would allow us 
to directly address the problem of scarce representation of female leaders in top-rank job positions. Is it harder 
for women to be elected leaders of a group or do women hesitate to lead?18 
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Appendix A – Table A.1. Details of treatments 
# Principals/Recipients/Agents 






































































Appendix B – Instructions (translated from Spanish) 
Treatment 1 
Introduction: 
Thanks for participating in the experiment! 
Please remember that from this moment on and till the end of the experiment no communication is 
permitted. If you have a question at any moment please raise your hands and we will answer your question in 
private. 
All identities in this experiment are anonymous. No one in the experiment will get to know your identity 
during or after the experiment. Please read the instructions with care. 
At the end of the experiment you will be paid your earnings and a 5 € show up fees. Your earnings are 
your private information. This project has been funded by grants from public institutions. 
 
Experiment Description: 
The experiment has twelve periods. The structure is explained of the experimentis the following. 
There are two types of players in this experiment: player A and player B. Each group will be made up of 
seven layer seach of players type A and B. 
At the start of the experiment you will be assigned a personal identification number by the computer. 
The computer will also inform you regarding the type of player you have been chosen to be. 
In each period, each player A is randomly paired with player B. In any period there are seven such 
pairings, each formed by a player A and a player B. 
At the start of the period 10€ will be assigned to each pairing. We will now explain to you the structure 
of the game. 
At the start of each period, player A decides how to allocate the 10€ to player B and herself. The 
allocations can be made in increments of 10 cents. The amount of 10€ will be fully allocated between players A 
and B. That is, the amount assigned to player B plus the amount player A decides to keep will always add to 10€. 
Once player A has taken their decision, each player A will be informed about the amount they have been 
assigned. 
At the end of each period all players, A and B, will see the information regarding the current and past 
periods, the identification numbers of their pairings and the amount assigned to them in each period. 
Payment: 
Besides the 5€ show up fees, each participant will be paid in the following manner. 
At the end of the experiment one of the periods will be randomly chosen for each player A and B. Each 
player will be paid the amount they earned in that period. 
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You will be individually called at the end of the experiment to be paid. You will inform the experiment 






Thanks for participating in the experiment! 
Please remember that from this moment on and till the end of the experiment no communication is 
permitted. If you have a question at any moment please raise your hands and we will answer your question in 
private. 
All identities in this experiment are anonymous. No one in the experiment will get to know your identity 
during or after the experiment. Please read the instructions with care. 
At the end of the experiment you will be paid your earnings and a 5 € show up fees. Your earnings are 
your private information. This project has been funded by grants from public institutions. 
 
Experiment Description: 
The experiment has twelve periods. The structure is explained of the experimentis the following. 
There are three types of players in this experiment: player A, player B and player C. Each group will be 
made up of six players each of players type A and B, and two players of type C. 
At the start of the experiment you will be assigned a personal identification number by the computer. 
The computer will also inform you regarding the type of player you have been chosen to be. 
In each period, each player A is randomly paired with player B. In any period there are six pairings, each 
formed by a player A and a player B. 
At the start of the period 10€ will be assigned to each pairing. We will now explain to you the structure 
of the game. 
Period 1: 
In period 1 each pair of players A and B will be assigned a player C. This implies that each player C is 
assigned to three different pairs of players A and B. 
Player C decides how to assign the 10€ between each pair of players A and B. The allocations can be 
made in increments of 10 cents. The amount of 10€ will be fully allocated between players A and B. That is, the 
amount assigned to player B and player A always add to 10€. 
The decisions made by player C, regarding how much to assign to players A and B, across different pairs 
are independent and need not be the same for each of the three pairs she has been assigned. 
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Once player C has made their decision, each player A and B will then be informed about the amount they 
have been assigned. 
Subsequent periods: 
In the subsequent periods, from period two on wards, player A’s screen will show two boxes. Each box 
shows the player ID (player ID and gender) of one of the two players C. 
Each player A has to select one of the two C players to make the decision regarding how to allocate the 
10 euros between players A and B. To select player C, player A simply needs to click on the asssociated box with 
that player C. 
Once all players A have made their decisions, Player C is then informed about the number of players A 
who have chosen him. Each player C decides how to allocate 10€ between players A and B. The allocations can 
be made in increments of 10 cents. The amount of 10€ will be fully allocated between players A and B. That is, 
the amount assigned to player B and player A always add to 10€. 
The allocation made by player C to a pair (A,B) is independent of the allocation made to another pair (if 
player C has been chosen by more than one player). If a player C has not been chosen by any player A then their 
screen will show a waiting message. 
Once player C has made their decision then all players A and B will be informed about the quantity 
allocated to them. 
At the end of each period all players, A and B, will see the information regarding the current and past 
periods, the identification numbers of their pairings and the amount assigned to them in each period. 




Besides the 5€ show up fees, each participant will be paid in the following manner. 
At the end of the experiment one of the periods will be randomly chosen for each player A and B. Each 
player will be paid the amount they earned in that period. That is, this will be amount that was allocated to them 
by player C in that period. 
At the start of the experimente ach player C is given an additional quantity of 5€. However, player C 
loses 0.45€ in each period and earns 0.15€ for each player that selects him. Player C´s earnings are the sum total 
of the earnings in the entire experiment. 
You will be individually called at the end of the experiment to be paid. You will inform the experiment 
about you ID number and you will be paid accordingly. 
Any questions? 
 
